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113 
THE DILUTION SOLUTION:  
POPULATING THE TRADEMARK A-LIST 
Scott C. Wilcox* † 
In our celebrity-conscious culture, the media serve as arbiters of fame. 
The editors of Us Weekly and People wield significant influence over public 
recognition of celebrities. Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
(“FTDA”) amended the Lanham Act in 1995, federal courts have adopted 
similar roles as arbiters of fame, determining which trademarks are suffi-
ciently famous to receive federal protection against dilution. Recent changes 
to the Lanham Act, however, reserve the availability of dilution actions to 
“A-list” marks. These changes fulfill the objectives of trademark law while 
achieving Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA. 
I. 
Dilution protection stems from a desire to maintain the value of famous 
trademarks. As the Supreme Court discussed in Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc., the common law prohibited trademark infringement in order to 
protect consumers against confusion generated by the use of infringing 
marks. Statutory bans on dilution, by contrast, are primarily concerned with 
maintaining the value of trademarks. Frank Schechter, in his influential 
1927 law review article entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protec-
tion, argued that trademark law should preserve the uniqueness of a 
trademark. He explained how “coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases 
. . . have . . . added to . . . the human vocabulary . . . and have created in the 
public consciousness an impression or symbol of the excellence of [a] par-
ticular product.” Schechter’s desired protection against what would 
eventually become known as dilution was slow to catch on. By enacting the 
nation’s first anti-dilution law in 1947, Massachusetts began a trend fol-
lowed by at least twenty-four additional states. However, as of 1995, a 
substantial minority of states had not yet addressed dilution. A House Judi-
ciary Committee report reveals that Congress, recognizing the variance 
among the states, enacted the FTDA in order to “bring uniformity and con-
sistency to the protection of famous marks.”  
Federal dilution actions have become popular among trademark owners, 
since they allow for injunctive relief even where no likelihood of confusion 
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exists. This trend is unsurprising, as investments in trademarks have steadily 
increased, causing trademark owners to be especially sensitive to their 
marks’ commercial value. According to Worldwatch, advertising revenues in 
the United States topped $273 billion in 2005. Additionally, a TNS Media 
study shows that each of the top ten advertisers in 2005 spent over one bil-
lion dollars in promoting their respective brands. Against this backdrop, 
what Beverly Pattishall observed in his 1984 article, Dawning Acceptance of 
the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, certainly 
remains true—the “number of product brands and images now competing 
for a few instants of awareness by the consumer increases annually.”  
Since the FTDA became law, several statutory requirements have con-
founded courts. The legislative history of the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act of 2006 (“TDRA”) supports a conclusion that the primary purpose of 
the TDRA was to abrogate the Supreme Court’s holding in Moseley—that 
actual evidence of dilution was required under the Lanham Act. In addition, 
there had been a continuing judicial struggle to develop a consensus on 
whether prominence within a region or “niche market” could support a find-
ing of fame under the Lanham Act. The recently enacted TDRA eliminated 
this method of acquiring fame. 
II. 
The House Judiciary Committee report accompanying the FTDA indi-
cated that the “geographic fame of the mark must extend throughout a 
substantial portion of the U.S.” The FTDA itself contained no such lan-
guage, but even if it had, “substantial” offers little meaningful guidance. As 
a result, it remained uncertain whether marks having prominence only in a 
“niche market” were famous for purposes of the Lanham Act. Thomas 
McCarthy, in his treatise Trademarks and Unfair Competition, identified the 
issue as being “whether a mark famous only to a small segment of buyers, 
such as professional buyers in a specialized market (e.g., professional flo-
rists) or a distinct subset of consumers (e.g., owners of pleasure sailing 
boats) is eligible for the special protections afforded by anti-dilution law.”  
At least one circuit had rejected the proposition that a mark’s promi-
nence within a niche market, without more, could fulfill the statutory fame 
requirement. The Second Circuit acknowledged the problem in TCPIP 
Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc. The TCPIP court doubted that 
Congress had “intended to confer on marks that have enjoyed only brief 
fame in a small part of the country, or among a small segment of the popula-
tion, the power to enjoin all other users throughout the nation in all realms 
of commerce.” Although the Second Circuit emphasized that examples in a 
legislative report do not set the boundaries of a statute, the court pointed out 
that Congress only mentioned marks that “for the major part of the century 
[had] been household words throughout the United States,” naming Dupont, 
Buick, and Kodak, which are “representative of the best known marks in 
commerce.”   
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Conversely, other courts had accepted that a mark renowned in a niche 
market could satisfy the Lanham Act fame requirement. The Third Circuit, 
in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., held that 
fame could arise from “a high degree of distinctiveness within [a niche] 
market.” Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hamp-
shire Paper Corp., directed the district court to consider whether the 
plaintiff’s trade dress was sufficiently famous within the niche market. The 
Syndicate Sales court reasoned that one of the statutory factors for evaluat-
ing fame suggested that prominence within a particular market could 
suffice: “the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading area and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the 
injunction is sought.”  
III. 
The TDRA has resolved the controversy by implicitly excluding niche 
markets from its definition of famous. An accompanying House Judiciary 
Committee report acknowledges this amendment, noting that the legislation 
alters the “threshold of ‘fame’ and thereby denies protection for marks that 
are famous only in ‘niche’ markets.” Accordingly, the Lanham Act now de-
fines a famous mark as one “widely recognized by the general consuming 
public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or ser-
vices of the mark’s owner.” In determining whether a mark is sufficiently 
recognized by the public, the statute specifies that courts should consider 
“all relevant factors,” including the duration, extent, and geographic reach of 
the mark’s advertising and publicity; the amount, volume, and geographic 
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; and the extent of 
the mark’s actual recognition. 
But is limiting dilution protection wise? While considering amendments 
to the FTDA, Congress recognized that the lack of clarity surrounding the 
definition of fame had promoted forum shopping and led to unnecessarily 
costly lawsuits. Narrowing the definition was not the only way to increase 
its clarity, however, as adopting a broader conception of fame could have 
achieved the same result. 
Nonetheless, a limited approach to dilution protection is most consistent 
with the legislative history of the FTDA. Congress intended dilution protec-
tion to be supplementary, applicable only where ordinary infringement law 
did not already provide a remedy. As the dissenting judge argued in Times 
Mirror, “[i]f marks can be ‘famous’ within some market, depending on how 
narrowly that market is defined, then the FTDA will surely devour infringe-
ment law.” Traditional infringement actions, the dissent noted, afford 
adequate protection within niche markets, eliminating the need for dilution 
protection. The dissent further pointed out that it is “hard to conceive of any 
consumer goods or services that are not in a narrow market of some type.” 
Narrowly defining fame also protects good faith competition. Trademark 
law initially developed in order to protect consumers against deceit. More 
recently, courts have offered broader relief against unfair competition, but 
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have constrained those actions by requiring a likelihood of confusion. 
Broadening the definition of fame would burden competition by seriously 
restricting the pool of marks available to prospective competitors. It would 
be impossible to justify such anticompetitive protection for senior trademark 
users, especially in situations where no confusion is likely.  
Limiting dilution protection is also compatible with Congress’s intent of 
improving global intellectual property protection for American companies. 
The FTDA’s legislative history repeatedly cites a desire to gain credibility 
for U.S. negotiators who were seeking better global protection of U.S. 
trademarks. On the Senate floor, Senator Leahy indicated that the FTDA 
would “strengthen the hand” of U.S. trade negotiators, stating that “[f]oreign 
countries should no longer argue that we do not protect our marks from dilu-
tion, nor seek to excuse their own inaction against practices that are 
destructive of the distinctiveness of U.S. marks within their borders.” The 
House Judiciary Committee report similarly explained that “[f]oreign coun-
tries are reluctant to change their laws to protect famous U.S. marks if the 
U.S. itself does not afford special protection for such marks.” Limiting dilu-
tion protection is not incompatible with these objectives because nationally-
recognized trademarks are the most likely targets for those seeking to capi-
talize on a mark’s goodwill. Although lesser known marks, such as those 
prominent only in a niche market, may also be co-opted abroad, that alone 
cannot justify expanding domestic protection. Moreover, the legitimacy pro-
vided to U.S. trade negotiators by federal dilution protection was derived 
primarily from the initial implementation of the FTDA, and altering the ex-
act scope of the protection is unlikely to significantly impact future trade 
negotiations.  
As courts begin to apply the new Lanham Act definition of fame, they 
will sometimes be confronted with difficult questions of proof surrounding 
whether a given mark is “famous.” The terms “widely recognized” and 
“general consuming public of the United States” are not completely trans-
parent. Nevertheless, Congress has wisely limited the scope of dilution 
protection to A-list brands. Courts will now be able to focus, just like the 
editors of Us Weekly and People, on the more nuanced factual question of 
whether a party appears on the A-list. 
